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This article develops the concept of ‘mediating bureaucrats’ by exploring their role during liberal reforms that 
led to rehabilitation of the sugar industry in Mozambique. By focusing on how relations between the state, 
government and business are mediated by a group of cadres who have occupied positions in different social 
domains, the article argues that these ‘mediating bureaucrats’ cannot easily be identified in one-dimensional 
terms as belonging to either the public or private sector, the state or the market. It is argued that as ‘socially 
embedded actors’, the group of ‘mediating bureaucrats’ are in a position to translate and mediate between 
diverse and sometimes conflicting interests and aspirations of the state, the government and business. We use 
the rehabilitation of the sugar industry in Mozambique to show how mediating bureaucrats adopted two 
practices – muddling through and translation – in order to straddle conflicting interests during different reform 
initiatives in post-independence Mozambique.  
 




High-level directors in the sugar industry who have moved between national or provincial 
governments, the state and the private sector in Mozambique often tell stories about their shifts in 
position from the colonial era via the post-independence state-centric organization of society to the 
present liberalized market economy. In different constellations of public and private office, they 
recount how they have experienced, arbitrated over and intersected with positions in both the public 
and private sectors of society. Moving between different positions in party, state and the public and 
private sectors is common for cadres emerging out of former one-party states such as Mozambique. 
This observation may seem trivial in southern and eastern African contexts where dominant one-party 
states have been and still are not only common but dominant.1  
Recent literature has emphasized how contexts dominated by one party and with cadres moving in 
and out the public and private domains, as well as state and business circles, facilitate clientelism 
(Kelsall 2013) linked to regime survival (Whitfield et al. 2015; Gray 2015; Behuria 2016), state 
capture (Southall 2013) and more broadly everyday or generalized corruption (Blundo & de Sardan 
2006; Schubert 2017). Except for Blundo & de Sardan and others who follow the more ‘street-level’ 
bureaucratic approach made famous by Lipsky (1980), in these other, mostly structural political 
economy accounts, the experiences of individuals and/or groups of cadres tend to disappear or 
become subsumed as primarily driven by narrow rational interest-based calculations related to regime 
survival that leave little space for the roles of ideas, history and agency (Lavers & Hickey 2016; 
Bebbington et al. 2018). Alternatively, all practices tend to be treated as related to the domain of ‘the 
state’, as political-science approaches more generally have a tendency to do, instead of seeing 
bureaucratic practices ‘as a bundle of practices and a system of social relations’ (Schubert 2017: 15).   
In this article, following Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 251), we will ‘bracket’ the ‘ordinary 
preconstructions’ of how we have understood the reforms and rehabilitation for a moment to explore 
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in greater depth the experiences of a group of Mozambican cadres who, over the last forty years, have 
taken up public and private positions spanning party, state and business related to the Mozambican 
sugar industry. This in turn, we will argue, will allow us to understand better the specific role this 
group of cadres played during the liberal reforms in which the rehabilitation of the sugar industry was 
embedded.  
The liberal reforms were initiated by Mozambique’s first president, Samora Machel, before his tragic 
death in 1986, but they took serious hold after his death when Joaquim Chissano took over from 
Machel and led Mozambique towards, the General Peace Accord of 1992 that ended the sixteen-year 
civil war between the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) and Resistência Nacional 
Moçambicana (Renamo) that had devastated Mozambique (Hall & Young 1977).2 
At the end of the 1980s, under the guidance of President Joaquin Chissano, the party-state 
bureaucracy of the Marxist-Leninist Frelimo party was tasked with preparing for the end of the 
sixteen-year civil war. This happened after Frelimo began a slow process of opening negotiations 
with the Renamo opposition, leading to the General Peace Accord (GPA) of 1992. However, long 
before the GPA a specialized agricultural ‘task force’ had been created that included high-level 
members of government ministries, state institutions and state industries. Luísa Diogo, then a 
technical adviser in the Ministry of Finance and later vice-finance minister before becoming Minister 
of Finance and ending her government career as Prime Minister, suggested the following when we 
discussed the post-conflict situation in 2010: ‘The cities could not absorb more people, so we had to 
get the rural areas developed. We analyzed many sectors for their potential to create job opportunities 
and provide services’ (Diogo 2010 int.).3   
Of particular concern were the pragmatics of stopping the inrush of internally displaced people to the 
booming cities and, at a later stage, offering demobilized soldiers a future in both urban and rural 
areas. Here the task force tried to identify industries that could provide jobs and income-earning 
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opportunities, as well as crucial export revenues for the government, given that the economy had 
come to a standstill by the end of the 1980s. As Luísa Diogo argued: ‘Sugar was one of them due to 
its proven track record’ (ibid. 2010 int.). This in turn led to the rehabilitation of the Mozambican 
sugar industry from 1995, which saw four out of six sugar estates become productive enough to 
service the internal sugar market that was created, as well as exporting sugar primarily to the EU. The 
process set in motion created between 20,000 and 30,000 jobs depending on how one counts formal 
and seasonal jobs (see Buur et al. 2011; 2012a; 2012b; Whitfield et al. 2015), and it also allowed 
thousands of cane out-growers to emerge in the south of Mozambique to feed the two plants in the 
region.  
Other accounts of the rehabilitation of the Mozambican sugar industry have focused on, for example, 
the problems cane smallholders confronted during the first phase of their involvement in cane 
production (Jelsma et al. 2010) or the gendered, health and historical labor continuities reproduced 
by the rehabilitation process (Lazzarini 2017; O’Laughlin & Ibraimo 2013; O’Laughlin 2017). 
Equally important are the fact that the rehabilitation of the sugar industry, with its extension into out-
grower schemes, has created land disputes and conflicts (see Mandamule 2017; 2018), as well as 
problematically reproducing Mozambique’s focus on mega-investments (see Mandlate 2014). We 
acknowledge these criticisms, but we will also argue that in the general sea of despair, where hardly 
any productive sectors were rehabilitated after the end of the civil war in 1992, it is still justified to 
focus on why and how the rehabilitation of the sugar industry was possible.  
In an earlier work on the role of the rehabilitation of the sugar industry, Buur et al. (2012b) identified 
the emergence of an ‘embedded and mediating bureaucracy’ as crucial for connecting the party-state 
to business interests in Mozambique during the liberal reforms leading up to sugar’s rehabilitation. 
The authors particularly suggested that the cadres of a mediating bureaucracy could broker diverse 
political interests and aspirations on the part of the state and government, as well as investors in the 
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industry, because of the embodied knowledge they had. They could therefore draw on both intimate 
tactical forms of knowledge and the rationales and concerns guiding government, state and industry. 
In this article we want to take this further by theoretically developing the concept of ‘mediating 
bureaucrats’ as ‘socially embedded actors’.  
We use two intertwined practices – muddling through and translating between multiple and often 
highly conflictual concerns and ideas – to denote what characterize the practices of ‘mediating 
bureaucrats’. Our analysis focuses on how the cadres in charge of rehabilitating the Mozambican 
sugar industry navigated in and shaped it, as well as the nature of power relations throughout the 
reforms. This will speak more broadly to the various political reforms in which the rehabilitation was 
embedded, which became part of how the continuity of Frelimo party control was reproduced in and 
through these neo-liberal reforms (Pitcher 2002; 2012; Whitfield et al. 2015; Macuane et al. 2018).4 
This article is based on a decade-long engagement with the Mozambican sugar sector and the cadres 
who were involved in the rehabilitation of the sugar industry from 1994 to 2018 over two periods, 
first from 2008 to 2012 (see Whitfield et al. 2015), and again from 2015 to 2019 (see Buur 2020 
forthcoming).5 We use only a smaller sample of interviews directly in this article in order to illustrate 
more general patterns related to the two practices mentioned earlier as having been pursued by these 
cadres: muddling through and translation.  
In the following sections, we first address how we understand the concept of ‘mediating bureaucrats’ 
as ‘socially embedded actors’. We then explore how these mediating bureaucrats acted in the reforms 
of the Mozambican sugar sector. This includes examining the historical experience of the industry’s 
successes and failures and the attempts to get it going again between independence and the present 
liberal era. In the process of tracing the mediating bureaucrats’ actions, we use the changing positions 
and shifting constellations of state-industry personnel over time to understand the general nature of 
the rehabilitation of the sugar industry that was embedded in Mozambique’s liberal reforms.  
 6 
MEDIATING BUREAUCRATS 
The concept of ‘mediating bureaucrats’ has not been widely used or defined, despite occasional 
references to it here and there. For example, Chambers (1977: 365) makes casual reference to the 
existence of a ‘mediating bureaucracy’, in contrast to situations in which there is no organized 
bureaucracy in rice-growing communities, but he does not provide any clarity regarding what the 
notion refers to more broadly, except that it relates to ‘the state’ in one way or another. Torry (2016: 
21) comes closer to a useful definition when, in a recent work, he discusses ‘institutions that mediate’, 
thus facilitating specific relationships. He is concerned with ‘mediation’ between secular and 
religious institutions or organizations that are sometimes also referred to as structures. Even through 
Torry seems to conflate institutions and organizations, as is common in the social sciences (see 
Douglas 1986 for a critique), more usefully he points to the importance of mediation as a particular 
kind of practice that resolves conflicts in society. Who or what that entity is or is related to is a 
question Torry leaves open, which is useful for our own understanding of the term ‘mediating 
bureaucrats’, which is also premised on a Weberian understanding of bureaucracy.   
Drawing on Weber, Evans (1995: 12), in his important work on ‘embedded autonomy’, pointed out 
that the state and its bureaucrats cannot be kept autonomous from the economic sphere if successful 
innovation and economic development is to be achieved. States and their bureaucrats must respond 
to ‘demands [for] more intimate connections to the private economic agents, a state that is more 
“embedded” in society than insulated from it’ (Evans 1995: 32). As we shall argue later, this is an 
important observation, but the significance of mediation in the literature on the state and business is 
primarily focused on the ‘embeddedness’ of state bureaucrats in the sense of their institutionalized 
engagement and relations with industry actors. For obvious reasons we are also inspired by Evans, 
but his understanding of bureaucrats is that in essence they are ‘external’ to the economy, whereas 
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we emphasize movements between party, state and industry in different constellations where what is 
inside and outside is less clearly demarcated. This leads us to the social embeddedness of actors.  
The embeddedness concept has been interpreted and used in various ways, but we draw primarily on 
Mark Granovetter's (1985) understanding, which focused on actors’ embeddedness rather than 
societies’ structural embeddedness. By highlighting the social embeddedness of all societies and 
economies, he also provided a way out of the dichotomies between traditional and modern societies 
common in embeddedness analysis in a Polanyian tradition (Krippner et al, 2004; Block 2001) 
meaning that ‘economic actions and actors always have to be understood in relation to the context in 
which they are embedded’ (Nystrand 2015:8). Granovetter’s actor focused approach to embeddedness 
is based on a critique of both over- and under-socialized views of economic behavior and suggests 
that actors are embedded in ‘concrete, ongoing, systems of social relations’ (Granovetter 1985: 487).6 
The mediating bureaucrats are here seen as such socially embedded actors, who embody the 
experiences of taking up formal positions in the state, the government, business and party and thereby 
become mediators between these social realms.   
One important context in which meditating bureaucrats act in our understanding is related to what 
Lipset (1960), drawing on Weber ([1968] 1978), focuses on: the bureaucracies themselves. That is, 
Lipset concentrates less on the institutional aspect and more on the bureaucracy and the individual 
bureaucrat within it, arguing that bureaucracies are major integrating mechanisms in society. This is 
because their members are in the nature of ‘an impartial expert rather than an interested party’ (Lipset 
1960: 52) due to their allegiance to Weberian bureaucratic norms. As such they are important in 
mediating conflicts in society, as they take on a mediating role in the way they act. Here Lipset follows 
Weber in arguing that this provides some stability during social change or other transitional periods, 
as bureaucratic procedures ‘tend to reduce conflicts to administrative decisions by experts, [thereby 
effacing] issues from the political arena’ (ibid.). A bureaucracy’s mediating role is in part due to what 
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we might call the ability to depoliticize contentious decisions, in our case to implement contentious 
policies by mediating and translating between ideological positions so that resistance to reforms is 
smoothed.  
Here it is important to remember that Weber not only discussed state bureaucracies, more generally 
he described and discussed the key characteristics of different ideal-typical forms of public 
administration, government and corporate business. In this modern way of understanding bureaucracy 
more generally, an administrative system governs any large society in both its public and private 
aspects. A bureaucracy can therefore refer to the centralized hierarchical structure of a public 
administration as much as to a corporate business or a multinational company. More broadly, the 
ideal-typical ‘bureaucracy’ Weber referred to, in both the public and private sectors, as well as in 
different combinations, was characterized by being ‘fundamentally [related to] domination through 
knowledge’ (Weber ([1968] 1978: 225). This knowledge involved understanding the hierarchy of the 
organization, with its formal as well as informal lines or chains of command related to fixed areas of 
activity. However, Weber and most of those who have studied bureaucracies have emphasized the 
formal aspects of the rigid division of labor, with bureaucrats involved in the regular and continuous 
execution of assigned tasks.7 Keith Hart (2008), by contrast, has repeatedly pointed out that, in the 
shadow of the formal aspect of bureaucracy, with all its benefits, we usually find bureaucrats with an 
intimate understanding of the informal working of a given bureaucracy who simply could not operate 
based on the formal procedures alone. In Hart´s (2008: 11) own words: ‘The formal and informal 
aspects of society are already linked, of course, since the idea of [the informal] is entailed by the 
institutional effort to organize society along formal lines. “Form” is the rule, an idea of what ought 
to be universal in social life’.8 
However, the formal sphere of society in all its public and private aspects does not just exist in the 
abstract, it ‘consists also of the people who staff bureaucracies [in public and private entities] and 
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their informal practices’ (Hart 2008: 12). It is this double aspect of bureaucracy we want to capture, 
using the concept of ‘mediating bureaucrats’ who can translate between the different political and 
economic ideologies and logics in which they are socially embedded. This implies navigating the 
uneven terrain of not only formal rules and regulations, but also what Blundo & de Sardan (2006: 5) 
refer to as the ‘tacit codes and practical norms’ at play in public services. They pointed out that 
following a formal rule guiding social activities is one thing, understanding the ‘tacit codes and 
practical norms’ allowing bureaucrats to translate between different political and economic ideologies 
and logics quite another. Although Blundo & Sardan explored everyday corruption in public services 
in West Africa, what we consider important is mediating bureaucrats’ ability to translate and navigate 
between the formal and informal, between different rules and ‘tacit’ codes.  
The tacit aspect of bureaucrats’ ways of operating was also pointed out as important by Buur et al. 
(2012b), who identified the emergence of an ‘embedded and mediating bureaucracy’ as crucial in 
connecting the state to business interests in Mozambique. The authors suggested particularly that the 
cadres had embodied knowledge – a certain ‘knowing-how’, while also ‘knowing-that’ (Ryle 1949) 
– for example, that ideology and political projects mattered to party and government officials. They 
were therefore able to draw on both intimate tactical forms of knowledge and the rationales and 
concerns guiding the government, the state and industry.  
In line with these arguments, by ‘mediating’ we mean that bureaucrats can translate and liaise 
between business and political interests, technical and technocratic concerns, and administrative and 
legal procedures. This clearly requires translating multiple political, ideological and pragmatic 
concerns without necessarily letting official policies be ‘reinterpreted beyond recognition’ by the 
bureaucracy (Kaviraj 1990: 13). In Mozambique, bureaucrats’ historical experiences of being socially 
embedded in the party-state, government and private industry on the one hand, and their 
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understanding of the enmeshing of these domains in one another on the other hand, gave them a 
unique position for mediating and translating.  
Besides translating, we wish to point out one further way of understanding mediating bureaucrats that 
is intimately related to ‘knowing how’ and tacit forms of knowledge, but which also focuses more on 
pragmatism. Often the experiences of the cadres or bureaucrats we encountered when studying the 
rehabilitation of the sugar industry and the liberal reforms in which it was embedded can best be 
described as ‘muddling through’ (see Lindblom 1959; 1979; see also Buur 2015 for a more recent 
use of this concept). The Cambridge Dictionary defines ‘muddling through’ as ‘to manage to do 
something although you are not organized and do not know how to do it’, while the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary suggests that it means ‘to achieve a degree of success without much planning or effort’ 
(see Buur 2015). For Lindblom (1959; 1979), ‘muddling through’ or ‘incrementalism’ is a way of 
trying to find a middle way between a rational actor model and bounded rationality – neither long-
term, goal-driven policies and analytical rationality on the one hand, nor laissez-faire approaches on 
the other. 
In the context of this article, muddling through should be understood as a way of working in and 
through a state-based and state-controlled planning apparatus – a top-down exercise – as well as a de 
facto need to take a gradual approach to addressing particular problems based on the embodied 
knowledge that success in economic planning is rarely reliant on blueprints for action. As the cadres 
we focus on here became astutely aware, planning is rather a result of contingent processes of 
implementation and unintended consequences (see Buur et al. 2011; 2012b). This is a modus operandi 
that comes closer to the Lévi-Straussian figure of the bricoleur (Lévi-Strauss 1966), with its focus on 
addressing concrete problems by combining different elements in new constellations to produce new 
solutions through an iterative process based on the resources, knowledge and experiences at hand. 
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We argue that this group of cadres – the ‘mediating bureaucrats’ – cannot be defined in simplistic and 
one-dimensional terms as belonging to the state, the government, business or party, as is commonly 
assumed. Instead the ‘mediating bureaucrats’ in charge of the rehabilitation of the sugar industry and 
the liberal reforms in which it was embedded were people who, over the last decade before the 
privatization reforms, had taken up formal positions in all these social realms in different 
configurations. But just because they are socially embedded, as Nystrand argues, ‘they are not 
following norms slavishly, but continuously negotiate with and reflect on social norms’ (Nystrand 
2015: 9).9 The mediating bureaucrats’ embeddedness in different social realms means that they 
negotiate and reflect on norms embedded in these varying realms, and thereby embody the capacity 
to mediate between state, government, business and party.  
As we shall discuss in the following sections, the existence of mediating bureaucrats during the post-
1990 liberal reforms in Mozambique was important because of the considerable mutual mistrust 
between the actors involved. On the one hand, parts of the state bureaucracy and the political elite did 
not trust the intentions of foreign investors and were apprehensive of the effects of allowing them to 
run former state industries. On the other hand, in most cases the foreign investors who began investing 
in Mozambique after 1992 had limited experience of working with a de facto one-party state apparatus 
and political system.  
 
MUDDLING THROUGH MULTIPLE EXPERIENCES 
An important characteristic of the sugar sector is that all the bureaucrats and leaders who were in 
charge of the rehabilitation of the sugar industry, including the union leaders we interviewed at the 
national and provincial levels, had been working in it in both ‘private’ and ‘public’ capacities since 
the 1970s. In different constellations, they had been educated by and/or worked for colonial-era 
private sugar estates, the post-colonial centralized state and the Frelimo party as cadres before taking 
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up positions in the party, the state and privatized companies after rehabilitation was initiated at the 
end of the civil war in 1992. This group of cadres had experienced with their own bodies, and acquired 
their specific skills from those experiences, what the sector had achieved in its heyday during 
colonialism, when it was the biggest formal employer in Mozambique, the leading sector with the 
biggest company (the colonial-era Sena company, whose core industry was sugar production 
controlling two sugar estates) and the third biggest exporter and foreign-currency earner. They had 
also experienced the struggles of the late 1970s under the centralized state system, when the six sugar 
companies were either nationalized or subject to other state intervention, as well as the total 
breakdown of the industry during the 1980s, when the civil war intensified. They had also been part 
of the unsuccessful attempts to rehabilitate the state-owned industry using foreign loans from, for 
example, the African Development Bank, at the end of the 1980s to the early 1990s (see Buur et al. 
2011; 2012b). These multiple and overlapping experiences of success and failure became a resource 
during the rehabilitation of the industry that was embedded in the liberal reforms that took shape after 
1990. 
The story told to one of the authors in 2011 by a former director of cane production on one of the 
sugar estates in Sofala province in Mozambique captures well the multiple experiences that informed 
his work. His experiences spanned both the colonial and post-independence eras, when the sugar 
industry was state-owned, after which he took up positions at the sugar institute in Maputo and at the 
provincial level in Sofala, where he was director when we met him:  
My father worked for the Sena Company, and I went to a company-supported school. Sena then gave me a 
bursary for an agricultural college in what was then Rhodesia [Zimbabwe since 1980]. Then came 
independence, and when I returned and had gone through political schooling, I was sent to one of the southern 
sugar estates to work there. I was then transferred to Sofala and the Mafambisse estate. It was difficult because 
of the [civil] war – we tried to produce, but sabotage undermined production, and we were always running out 
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of supplies and inputs or they came too late. I then became director of the sugar estate’s agricultural department 
and became part of the executive. I was then transferred to the National Sugar Institute in Maputo before later 
on returning to Sofala and becoming a member of the provincial government, where I now work as a director 
[for one of the line ministries] (Former Dir. Cane production Mafambisse Sofala 2011 int.). 
Being a provincial line-ministry director today was in large part made possible by the colonial sugar 
company and the schooling it provided, as well as the experiences this cadre acquired within the 
framework of the post-colonial party-state. Like other cadres who had come out of the twin 
experiences of the colonial and state-owned sugar industry, he saw the demise of the sugar sector as 
tragic: these cadres knew it could have been avoided with a mixed economy, and they suggested that, 
had the postcolonial state pursued its centralizing policies less rigidly and allowed a greater degree 
of flexibility, it might have been enough to meet changing market conditions (world market 
conditions seriously deteriorated after 1974, when sugar prices plummeted). Flexibility did not apply 
to the international market alone but also to responses to internal conditions such as the civil war, 
labor incentives and productivity, and the production, organization and mobilization of inputs.  
The former director of the Maragra estate in southern Mozambique after independence, when the 
state took over after roughly 300,000 people of predominantly Portuguese origin were in part forced 
out and in part fled out of fear of the incoming post-colonial regime (see Weimer et al. 2012; Sumich 
2018), suggested that these problems were nested in one another: 
When inputs, for example, fertilizer, were requested by an estate and conveyed to the National Sugar Institute 
[INA], they first had to request currency from the Ministry of Finance to buy it [and that took time, as foreign 
exchange was limited]. If they got foreign currency to buy it [after some time], they then had to find a seller. 
This could be difficult, as we were at war, and the Cold War also imposed problems. East European countries 
were not reliable for inputs. They were always late, and the quality was not good. Then they needed to get it 
to Mozambique, which also required currency, and then begin distribution to the six estates during a war 
situation, which was yet another obstacle. Before any fertilizer arrived, it would already be time to harvest. 
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With no proper organization and storage facilities, the fertilizer would perish before the next season, and the 
planning nightmare would repeat itself (Former Director Maragra, Lisbon 2010, int.). 
This particular cadre, who had been trained as an agrarian economist, only to be given the daunting 
task of managing the newest of the six sugar estates and mills when productive units declined as 
skilled people and owners abandoned the industry, suggested that, despite such problems: 
‘There was a lot of good will and good intentions, as we wanted to change the rural countryside and produce 
for the New Society – we wanted to succeed, but we did not have sufficient knowledge or capacity to make it 
work’. All kinds of inputs were needed, such as spare parts to make the production run at all in a state-
centralized system […] There was too much control and top-down decision-making. We tried our best, but did 
not succeed’ (ibid.). 
This particular cadre later moved out of Mozambique and relocated to Portugal where we meet, but 
he maintained close contact with other former cadres. He was well aware of developments in the 
industry and had been very supportive of state control of it after independence and its aim of changing 
the rural countryside to be more accommodating of Frelimo party ideas (see below for a discussion 
of the New Society). But this cadre was also very clear about the challenges faced by this state-
directed industry. 
As the above account of their experiences clearly suggests, these cadres, who had experience 
spanning several decades as industry, state and party actors, had a keen eye for the problems a state-
based system could encounter from a market-driven procurement system. On one level they knew 
what the aim was and what was required to increase production, or even just to produce, and also how 
difficult this could be in a highly centralized state system. They were aware of the policies and aims 
involved and were highly motivated, but they also knew that none of this guaranteed success. At 
another level, even if these cadres did not fully understand the operation of the international market, 
then at least they had some experience of its modus operandi and the constraints involved in trying 
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to market sugar in an international system. Although ostensibly free and equal for all, this market was 
actually characterized by high levels of protection by some countries, while ‘dumping price’ practices 
undercut the viability of others’ production (INA 1996; LMC & Global Sugar Consulting 2000).  
We suggest that the ability of people like these cadres to ‘muddle through’ with regard to policy 
changes from the colonial via the post-colonial to the liberal reforms of the 1990s is absolutely key 
for understanding why policies in the sugar sector were actually implemented, in contrast to other 
sectors that were promoted just as much, but that fared far less well (see Pitcher 2002 for cotton; Buur 
et al. 2011 for cashew). This group of cadres had intimate knowledge of success and failure they 
could draw on, as they encountered new obstacles and needed to find pragmatic ways to deal with 
real-life policy decisions after liberalization in 1994. What makes it important is that they captured 
both the how and the what of expanding industry interests and needs on the one hand, and the diverse 
and often contradictory mixture of state-party and government political imperatives on the other. This 
was concerns and problems that would emerge with the reform of the sugar sector and the wider 
political and economic liberalization reforms in which the sector was embedded. Here the key to 
muddling through in unfamiliar territory was to use the experiences these cadres had acquired while 
straddling the colonial and post-colonial eras in an ad hoc fashion in the new context of the liberal 
reforms. 
These cadres had seen the sector fall victim to dumping prices in trying to rely on sugar exports for 
revenue purposes during the post-independence period, and they had also to come to realize that all 
sugar-producing countries base their production on two pillars: internal markets and external trade 
agreements (see  LMC 2004; Buur et al. 2011.). Entering into such trade agreements with the US and 
the EU in particular, as well as with east European countries, did not just happen by itself but required 
coordinated international lobbying by both the industry and the Foreign Ministry, which formally 
signed such agreements.10 The changing positions and shifting constellations of party, state and 
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industry personnel among the mediating bureaucrats meant that cadres in charge of the reforms had 
tacit knowledge of how to work within changing policy environments.  
For example, even though ideologically the trade union president for the sugar industry was aligned 
with the old guard of socialists around the now late Marcelino dos Santos and therefore favored a 
state-owned sugar industry, he had himself experienced the problems of the state-owned and centrally 
governed industry after 1975. He had also taken part in the rehabilitation efforts during the 1980s and 
realized that, without strong foreign partnerships, finance, technology and market access, 
rehabilitation would be an uphill battle (President SINTIA, Maputo 2009 int.). He therefore met with 
leaders within Frelimo’s nomenklatura, who were against the reforms on socialist ideological 
grounds, to get them to understand that the reform could industrialize and urbanize peasants through 
other means that could nonetheless still be seen as a continuation of Frelimo policies. Just when he 
was acting as a go-between when attempts to block the illegal trade in sugar needed the support of 
the socialist ideologues in the party, the Chissano administration confronted the business empire of 
the future President Guebuza. We argue that it was this particular blend of skills and experiential 
knowledge that made it possible for mediating bureaucrats like this union leader to ‘muddle through’ 
using their experiences and their factual and tacit knowledge to straddle various ideological frontiers. 
Despite their experiences of decline and the more or less total breakdown of the sector, they were 
adamant that it would be possible to get the flagship of modern rural industrialization in Mozambique 
up and running again, but from their experience they had also realized that political backing in itself 
would not be enough. As a consequence, assistance from outside Mozambique would be required as 
well, and they acknowledged that private investments could be important. As one cadre who had been 
active in the party after independence and later became the national director of INA and, in the new 
millennium, the first ‘black’ Mozambican director of one of the privatized companies argued in 2010: 
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‘The state has its limits, particularly when it comes to sourcing and developing new technology. Free sugar 
marketing is complicated, and accessing new (protected) markets is a major struggle. Combined private 
industry knowledge about marketing and state-brokered access to loans and markets can go hand in hand. It 
requires both parties to accommodate each other, to give and take, and that is the struggle we encountered. But 
it is possible’ (Former Director INA, Maputo, 2010 int.). 
It was knowledge and experience of the different spheres and the inner workings of the party, the 
state and business in their fragmented forms that were important for the emergence of those we call 
‘mediating bureaucrats’ in the Mozambican sugar industry. The cadres were ‘bureaucrats’ in the 
Weberian sense (Weber 1946: 196-204), as they had been working in and had been in charge of the 
industry after independence and were embedded in the liberalizing reform initiatives after 1994. It 
was cadres who had muddled through during the colonial, post-colonial and post-civil war liberalizing 
reforms who realized their own limitations as the drivers of a state-centralized industry after 
independence, as well as the need to involve the state in the liberal reforms. They used this tacit 
knowledge to deal with the constraints of the global market economy in which they had to operate 
when marketing sugar, procuring technology and inputs, and trying to upgrade and make the industry 
more effective after 1994. This particular set of experiences consisted in paradoxically running down 
an industry and then trying to rehabilitate it within a liberalizing regime without unnecessarily 
upsetting important ideological hardliners from the Marxist-Leninist period, as we indicated above. 
We will discuss this further in the next section, where we consider the ability of mediating bureaucrats 
to translate multiple concerns.  
 
TRANSLATING MULTIPLE CONCERNS 
The mediating bureaucrats who were embedded in the liberal reforms that were introduced after 1986 
but were speeded up after 1990 could intercede and translate between foreign direct investment (FDI) 
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and the state’s, government’s and Frelimo party’s needs as they changed over time. The mediating 
bureaucrats embodied and, in different configurations, were able to  draw on experiences that gave 
them an intimate understanding of the different aspirations of investors, the state, the government and 
party officials, while still being able to play on and promote each of these aspirations when necessary 
during the reform process, as they translated between multiple concerns. In the process, they changed 
the socio-economic matrix within which the sugar industry operated. As a result, it went from being 
a sector revolving around a profoundly party-state-industry-based nexus in the 1980s to something 
closer to a mixed liberal economy in the 2000s, when the sugar industry, while still largely reliant on 
the protection of state tariffs and state co-ownership, operated more and more independently.  
Translating liberal reforms and privatization into a form that could appropriate the ideological terrain 
and win the ideological hardliners who felt that the post-1990 liberal reforms were abandoning the 
post-independence socialist project was not easy. A key concern for the Chissano regime, particularly 
after 1994 and the first democratic elections that followed the first wave of liberalizing reforms, was 
job creation after the civil war and the closing of redundant state-owned industries in urban areas. 
This happened when people began returning from internally displaced camps (IDPs) after the 1992 
General Peace Accord. A policy that could, with a degree of translation, cater for both issues was to 
create an ‘urban labor class’ in rural areas by rehabilitating the sugar industry.  
A former state-industry cadre that among things had been Director of the Buzi sugar estate before 
taking up various positions in the privatized sugar industry after 2000 elaborated in an interview in 
2010 on the sugar industry’s track record as ‘the biggest (private) employer in Mozambique before 
independence’ and as a ‘key export commodity’ that ‘made colonial investors rich’, as well as 
highlighting the sugar industry’s ‘proven capacity to monetize and industrialize the rural areas’ (see 
also the National Sugar Policy, INA 1996). Here in particular the industry’s capacity to change labor 
relations and turn ‘petty peasants into labor that could work in the industry’ was valued (Former 
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Director at Buzi sugar estate, Maputo, 2010, int.). Job creation in the sugar industry allowed these 
cadres to connect the particular ideological history of creating a New Society after independence with 
liberalizing reforms in Mozambique – two histories that were in opposition. However, being able to 
tap into this history of changing rural areas was important in mobilizing support for key aspects of 
the strategy behind the rehabilitation (see INA 1996), as it legitimized liberalizing state ownership 
with some state participation. The liberalization of the industry and the involvement of FDI were 
contested politically within the ruling Frelimo coalition, where members of the old hardline 
ideological faction did not want to back down over retaining the Marxist-Leninist tenets of the post-
independence state project, in which state control was imperative. However, if FDI and liberal 
reforms could somehow be presented not only as supporting Frelimo policies but also as delivering 
this imperative in a new way, this could soften the implacability of their resistance.  
One key area for understanding how post-independence concerns relating to transforming society 
came to be translated into the domain of liberal reforms is the policy of ‘urbanizing the rural’, which 
suggests a continuation of post-independence policies to create a Homem Novo (New Man) and a 
Sociedade Nova (New Society) (see Buur 2010; Sumich 2018; Buur & Sumich 2019). After 1996 
party, state and industry cadres and officials implementing the sugar rehabilitation policy repeatedly 
emphasized that, wherever the sugar industry had asserted itself, one saw a greater transformation of 
rural areas compared to other agricultural, industry and infrastructural investments. In particular, 
when the sugar industry became operational after 2000 (see Buur et al. 2012b), there were a number 
of knock-on effects, including expansions of local trade, public services, banking and credit, and 
infrastructure (roads and communications). In general, the rural economy around the industrial plants 
changed, as far more resources and services (markets, banking and telecommunications, as well as 
the transport of cane, workers and agricultural labor) emerged, and with it came improvements in the 
provision of infrastructure related to transport, education, health, water and other state services. The 
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argument was that the sugar-producing areas stood out as ‘islands’ of modernity in a landscape of 
superstition and authority based on culture and ethnicity. The fact that the sugar industry was known 
for providing superior, quasi-urban social services in housing, education, health and water made it 
special for the Frelimo leadership.  
The ability to link the transformative capacity of the sugar sector in rural areas during the liberal 
reforms to Frelimo’s long-term post-independence socialist drive towards the idealized, modern and 
rational Homem Novo and Sociedade Nova that would transform colonial society and its social 
relations (see Buur 2010; see also Sumich 2013) was important in creating political support for the 
rehabilitation of the industry. This deep link between post-independence concerns related to social 
transformation and post-socialist concerns with market relations nonetheless needed some translation.  
Samora Machel’s vision as the first president had been for a society cleansed of its traditional 
divisions: ‘No tribes, no regions, no races, no religious belief [...] to divide us’ (Machel 1981: 43). 
After independence, rural transformation was attempted through ‘collectivization’: peasants, or 
family-based’ subsistence farmers, as they were largely but wrongly regarded (given that they were 
integrated into the world market in multiple ways), were forcibly concentrated into collective villages 
or state farms with little consideration for their market-based livelihoods, which mainly took the form 
of cash-crop production and seasonal migrant labor. This forcible and often quite violent attempt at 
‘uprooting’ the populations of the rural hinterlands and gathering them into villages was expected to 
bring with it access to education and health, to political training, to the party-state authorities and so 
on, thus creating the conditions for the internal liberation of Man, not only from traditional society, 
but also from all elements of capitalist exploitation and colonial divisions.11  
The transformative capacity of the sugar industry is what the president of the sugar producers’ 
organization (APAMO) referred to as ‘urbanizing the rural’ or ‘making hostile populations more 
positive to change’ (President APAMO, Maputo 2008 int). This was also what Prime Minister Diogo 
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later suggested in a series of interviews during 2008-2010 with one of the authors, as well in her book 
A sopa da madrugada: das reformas à transformação económica e social em Moçambique, 1994-
2009 (Diogo 2013). She forcefully pointed out that a major concern of the Chissano government, as 
people returned from internal and external refugee camps after the peace accord in 1992, was access 
to services they had been accustomed to, but also that returnees needed to be accommodated so that 
they did not feel abandoned.  
The APAMO president had been part of the rehabilitation process from the outset in 1995 and had 
taken up positions in the post-independent state-party before becoming president of the sugarcane 
producers. As a core example of a mediating bureaucrat, he had served as the state industry’s 
representative at the Buzi sugar estate during the civil war and later as advisor to the governor of 
Sofala during liberalization. The APAMO president was well placed to appraise the contradictions 
that had to be reconciled between on the one hand the project to create the New Man and Society 
after independence in 1975 through socialist relations, and on the other hand, after the end of the civil 
war in 1992, the transformation that was to take place through and with capitalist relations, as well as 
the measures required to facilitate this displacement of goals. The old ideological vanguard was not 
naïve, but it trusted mediating bureaucrats such as the APAMO president, who had worked closely 
with them as a loyal party cadre in state-owned enterprises, line ministries and at the provincial level 
when they had all taken up high positions in the Frelimo state as governors of key provinces, ministers 
and directors of state industries. The story of how the old ideological project of the New Society was 
linked to the rehabilitation of the sugar industry as part of the liberal reforms was echoed by all 
interviewees regardless of faction. That this was a paradox or contradiction in terms was exactly the 
point – being able to bridge and translate the divide was what allowed the mediating bureaucrats to 
find the political support to push forward the reforms. One way in which this group of hesitant leaders 
was, if not convinced, then eased into support related to ownership. Continued ownership of the sugar 
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industry by the state was contested by both the old ideologues, who disliked being involved with FDI, 
and the foreign investors, who severely distrusted the intentions of the Frelimo state with respect to 
its ownership, as they feared interventions. 
 
MEDIATING BETWEEN COMPETING INTERESTS 
A surprising feature of the rehabilitation process was that, until around 2012, the Mozambican state 
(through the Banco de Moçambique) was still a main player in the sugar sector. Today it still has 
shares in more than one company, but until after 2012 it was actually a majority shareholder in three 
of the four companies (see Buur 2011). This was after the first two waves of privatization involving 
heavyweight South African and Mauritian capital, management and knowledge infusion. The 
Mauritian stake was later taken over by large French-Brazilian capital interests, and one of the South 
African companies, Illovo, was bought up by one of the biggest players in the sugar industry globally, 
Associated British Foods plc. Besides big corporate international sugar interests, a few private 
investors, some of whom were former sugar-company owners from the colonial era like the Petiz 
family from Portugal (involved with Maragra and later on cane production at Buzi in Sofala), became 
involved after the restructuring and privatization (Buur et al. 2012a; 2012b). In a country apparently 
overrun by neoliberal reforms (Hanlon 1991; Obarrio 2014), it came as a major surprise that the state 
still had major interests in the industry. This first became clear when individual sugar estates wanted 
to promote individualized marketing strategies when international sugar prices peaked after 2012 
after they had been forced by the state to pursue collective marketing through the National Sugar 
Distributor (DNA) after 1994 (see Buur 2011; 2012b). 
The reasons why the privatization of the sugar industry did not mean the Mozambican state  
relinquishing its ownership of or control over the sugar sector has both political and economic 
underpinnings, and they were intimately related to the particular way in which access to finance for 
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the rehabilitation of the industry was initially provided. Here the mediating bureaucrats as ‘socially 
embedded actors’ played a key role in mediating between different competing interests emanating 
from industry actors and government. 
In order to access cheap loans for the rehabilitation process, besides what the investing companies 
could bring to the table themselves, the Mozambican state ‘borrowed’ money from special funds like 
OPEC and the Kuwait Foundation and handed it over to the sugar companies (Diogo 2010 int.; 
Whitfield & Buur 2014). In exchange, the state retained 51% of the shares after the foreign companies 
had bought themselves into the industry after 1994. The state percentage in fact first saw a large cut 
in 2008, when private investors began a new round of upgrading and expansion of cane production 
in order to increase productivity further. This expansion was in large part stipulated by the EU’s 
accompanying measures (AMSP 2009). As new investments were made, the state share of ownership 
slowly diminished further. For the state this initial arrangement was beneficial: as the private investors 
serviced the ‘state loan’, the state’s credit ranking increased so that it could take out new state loans 
for other projects at cheaper rates (see Buur et al. 2011). This arrangement not only created links 
between the FDI-driven sugar companies, the state bureaucracy and the government, it also enmeshed 
ownership structures in three out of the four sugar estates that were rehabilitated.  
This was a risky arrangement for both the Frelimo government and the state, as well as the 
international companies. While the state and the party relinquished day-to-day management of the 
sugar estates to foreign companies and their staff, they maintained close control over their boards and 
over how sugar rents from creating a protected internal market were distributed and to whom. First, 
as a guarantee and a way of monitoring the companies, the government appointed one or two 
representatives to the boards at the outset of the privatization process, and three companies still had 
such representatives as late as 2016. The appointees were highly ranked cadres whom we regard as 
members of the mediating bureaucracy, people from either the party-state or the state-business sector. 
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For example, the former director of the National Sugar Institute (INA), who was previously in charge 
of drawing up the rehabilitation strategy, was appointed to all the administrative boards. He paid 
special attention to Tongaat-Hulett’s investments in Xinavane in the south and Mafambisse in the 
center of the country, where he later became executive director until 2017. The new INA director 
who took up the mantle after 1996 later served on the board of Marromeu until 2009. Other members 
of the boards were high-level Frelimo or state officials with similar experiences from the era of 
centralized industrialization, civil-war management and the transition to a mixed economy during 
liberalization. They were cadres who had alternated between party, state and industry. 
According to Luísa Diogo, the former Prime Minister, members of the mediating bureaucracy who 
served as state representatives on the boards and in the leadership of companies were important 
because they ‘served as our eyes and ears, as many members of the party did not trust FDI’ (Former 
Prime Minister Luísa Diogo, 2010 int.). What Diogo is referring to here is the mistrust of the 
liberalizing reforms on the part of the hardcore socialist ideologues, as they feared the country would 
be taken over by foreign capital, thus undermining Frelimo’s legitimacy and its control over society 
and the economy. However, by placing trusted cadres in key positions on boards and in the 
management of the industry, this allowed the state to prevent breaches of contract and to ensure that 
the companies honored the financing deals, which ultimately had implications for the government’s 
credit-worthiness. Particularly during the early years after the end of the civil war, the formal links 
with company boards allowed the state to follow the rehabilitation process closely, monitoring it so 
as to ensure that the politically important aspects of the rehabilitation plan were being followed, such 
as job creation and social service provision. A known aspect of this was that the industry suspended 
automating cane-cutting, thus making sure that thousands of temporary cutters’ jobs would be 
available every year during the harvest up to and after Christmas.  
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This special arrangement also allowed the mediating bureaucrats to mediate industry concerns, 
particularly when companies were confronted with labor unrest (see Buur & Sumich 2019) or when 
they struggled to have important inputs released from the ports when they were kept there because of 
red tape. In particular, as a director of one of the sugar companies, a former INA director and 
longstanding state representative on several estates, argued (Former Director INA 2010, int.):  
We can push the companies so they take their CSR seriously so social services are available – the building and 
maintenance of schools, health and housing facilities, water provision and so on, which in turn were 
underpinned by the ideological project of transforming rural populations – and so that training of the work 
force is honored without undermining the economic sustainability of the estates.  
Second, while the companies certainly felt that they had become enmeshed in the webs of influence 
within the Frelimo state as it emerged after the GPA of 1992 and during the liberalizing reforms, and 
therefore were put under pressure to support election campaigns (providing cars, lorries and other 
contributions), creating jobs and minimizing import costs, it also provided ample ground for trade-
off agreements between the companies and the party-state. Such trade-off negotiations and decisions, 
which benefitted both parties, required that the right people, those who understood the needs of 
international capital and how to translate them into national political concerns, could be mobilized. 
Here the mediating bureaucrats – greatly valued, as they could bridge different concerns so that 
policy-wise they could support each other, even if they were somehow mutually contradictory. 
International investors, for example, needed some protection for the internal market in order to be 
able to recover the costs of their investing in a situation of risk. By legislating and enforcing the 
implementation of a flexible tariff for sugar imports, the government pursued a means of protecting 
infant industries (Buur et al. 2012b). Aligning related but ideologically different policy trajectories 
became a major input that mediating bureaucrats could provide, thus allowing reform of the industry 
to continue, despite being contested by World-Bank liberalists, anti-liberalist NGOs and post-
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independence centralists. During this process the mediating bureaucracy, were important in that they 
facilitated the transition of the sugar industry from being state-owned to being the predominantly 
foreign-owned industry it is today.  
In short, the mediating bureaucrats in the sugar companies were able to influence state and 
government actors to assist the companies when, for example, the tariff system that protected the 
industry from outside competition needed to be adjusted or renewed (see Buur et al. 2012b; Buur 
2020 forthcoming). By having what we have referred to as mediating bureaucrats placed strategically 
in boardrooms as ‘socially embedded actors’ leading the main interest organization in different 
capacities in each of the companies, conflicting expectations and interests could be aligned. Because 
this group of cadres had knowledge and sufficient political savvy due to their deep-rooted historical 
understanding of what other actors, whether in the state, the party, government or industry, needed in 
order to continue the association they could get things moving. They could even overcome the 
devastating flooding washed away hundreds of millions of USD, as in 2000/2001, 2007/2008 and 
again in 2013 (UNDP 2014).12   
This group could draw on empathy from having seen the industry erode after independence, as they 
stayed on when, after independence, the political project imploded, trying to rescue what could be 
rescued, as well as issuing informed communications about the challenges and possibilities that could 
be mutually beneficial for the state, the government and investors based on some degree of ‘mutual 
interest’ (Whitfield & Buur 2014). In a dominant one-party state there are always people who, due to 
party-state connections, a history of common struggle or a shared organizational history, have 
influence beyond their title or official duties. What they have may come close to what Ferris et al. 
(2005: 127) refer to as ‘political skill’, defined as: ‘The ability to effectively understand others at 
work, and to use such knowledge to influence others to act in ways that enhance one's personal and/or 
organizational objectives’. Cadres with such understandings can allow trust and ability to be listened 
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to, creating the basis for being able to exert influence that could amount to political savvy. Political 
savvy for mediating bureaucrats meant that they could translate and communicate difficult political 
and economic realities to all parties: industry, state and government. Such mediation allowed the 
rehabilitation to move forward until 2019, when it stalled due to the Idai cyclone, the effects of the 
disappearance of the lucrative European internal market, industry actors’ corporate strategies and the 
government turn to gas and minerals as the most important sectors to use for support for purposes of 
political survival (see Buur 2020 forthcoming). However, that is a story for the future.  
 
BY WAY OF CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have suggested that the concept of ‘mediating bureaucrats’ as ‘socially embedded 
actors’ is useful when trying to understand how certain policy processes move in certain contexts. 
The article used the rehabilitation of the sugar sector in Mozambique and the wider process of liberal 
reforms in which it was embedded to explore two practices that characterize the work of mediating 
bureaucrats: muddling through and translation. Using Mozambique as an example, we have shown 
how the implementation of the sugar rehabilitation policy would not have been possible without 
cadres’ ability to translate and mediate between conflicting interests. The mediating bureaucrats drew 
on the historical experiences of success and failure they had acquired from the colonial era before 
1975, the post-independence experience of implementing socialist economic policies (and their 
failures) and a series of more pragmatic political and economic experiences that emerged as the liberal 
reforms took hold. This gave the cadres as ‘socially embedded actors’ a unique understanding of 
longer-term ideological stances, principally related to the post-independence era, but also to the 
market-based ideas and needs that took root with the new liberal policies. Given Mozambique’s past 
as a former one-party state, the type and form of business interests one could engage in after 
independence in 1975 were party/state-centered and formally operated within a Marxist-Leninist one-
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party framework. Even though after 1990 a new constitution formally separated state and party, as 
well as the public and private spheres of society, this did not function as such in practice. The actual 
experience and manifestation of these processes challenge the conventional notion of a clear 
separation of social spheres – for example, party, state, and market – that is common in mainstream 
political and economic theory (Block, 1994).13  
As ‘socially embedded actors’, the cadres took up distinct positions as state, company, government 
and party representatives at different times, conceptually being referred to as ‘mediating bureaucrats’. 
As we have suggested in this article, mediating bureaucrats had the know-how that allowed them to 
muddle through when managing workers and dealing with processes of accumulation; they had 
familiarity with issues around FDI capital and knew how to deal with government officials. This 
know-how emanated from experiences dating back to the colonial era and more particularly from the 
post-independence era, and they also had a clear understanding of foreign investors’ needs and 
requirements after the end of the civil war in 1992. This allowed this group of cadres to facilitate the 
liberal reforms that saw the sugar industry rehabilitated after 1994. As they facilitated the 
transformation of the sugar industry from being state-owned to being predominantly privately owned, 
those within the mediating bureaucracy drew on their growing fund of knowledge and know-how, 
which accumulated with each new position they took up over time, to make the rehabilitation of the 
industry work. As discussed above, bureaucrats’ translation and mediation of conflicting interests is 
an active processes of reinterpreting elite policies and investor interests and rendering them 
understandable in different vernacular idioms. In the Mozambican case we can take this still further, 
as the work of the mediating bureaucrats not only attempted to translate the multiple needs and 
concerns of government, state and industry positions as they moved between them. In the process 
they also contingently transformed the sugar sector from being state-led to becoming more of a 
market-led sector during the 2000s.  
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To suggest that mediation was important in the process of rehabilitation is not by any means to imply 
that it was itself non-conflictual. In fact, conflict was rampant at all stages, over the selection of which 
estates to rehabilitate (south or central/north); how to finance the rehabilitation (foreign direct 
investment or state-guaranteed loans); the creation of an internal market (pitting top party members, 
supporters and traders involved in dealing in contraband sugar against the reformed custom 
authorities and trade union members); how to share export and internal revenues between the sugar 
companies; and questions related to ownership (foreign or national). The existence of mediating 
bureaucrats with experience of all these formal positions meant that they could liaise between labor 
and employers, business and political interests, technical and technocratic concerns, and 
administrative and legal procedures both formally and informally, which in turn ensured that conflicts 
were never stalemated for too long. This also allowed mistrust to be confronted so that it did not 
impede rehabilitation. The ability of the bureaucrats to bridge the different interests and expectations 
of the political elite on the one hand and new foreign-industry actors on the other hand throughout 
the process was crucial to the progress of the rehabilitation project. 
The key here is to understand the relationships and historical encounters that were forged between 
former party-state and industry-state personnel, including government actors, which generated both 
continuity and the ability to engage with foreign investors after the turn to liberal reforms and 
privatization from the mid-1980s, which only peaked, however, after 1994. This implied that in the 
Mozambican case the relationship between the state and private capital was intertwined and enmeshed 
not only after independence, but also after the liberal reforms of which the mediating bureaucrats, as 





1. For example, the ANC in South Africa, SWAPO in Namibia, ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, the MPLA in Angola and 
the CCM in Tanzania. 
2. Frelimo and Renamo fought a devastating sixteen-year civil war from 1976 to 1992. The war started as a Cold War 
destabilization war, with Renamo supported first by the Rhodesian regime and, after Zimbabwe’s independence, by the 
apartheid regime in South Africa. The war quickly developed into a civil war, as Renamo tapped into criticism of the 
centralized Marxist-Leninist policies of the post-independence era that marginalized populations in the center and north 
of the country. The civil war destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure and displaced up to 40% of its population. 
3. Joao Mosca a leading agricultural expert and academic who himself became one of the young cadres that after 
independence was given huge responsibilities has reflected on the post-independence and liberal transitions in relation to 
the agricultural sector (see Mosca 2010) in ways that clearly echo many of the points made by our interviewees. 
4. In this article we will not discuss how the liberal reforms in which Mozambique became embedded were neo-liberal 
and what this meant more broadly. Here it is sufficient to point out that there were both external pressures to adopt liberal 
reforms (see Hanlon 1996) and internal pressures and interests in finding ways of tapping into resources, knowledge and 
market access so that the regime could survive (Pitcher 2002; Whitfield et al. 2015; Weimer et al. 2012). This story forms 
a contrast to how the neoliberal reforms and privatization are usually presented as an external imposition in Mozambique 
(see Obarrio 2014; Hanlon 1991; Castel-Branco 2002). 
5. Our account is historical, since the people we refer to were professionally active from colonial times (formally 
ending in 1975). Their importance for the post-independence reforms and later liberal reforms therefore have an end-
point that has implications for their role during current developments, as indicated in later parts of the article. 
6. However, subsequent research based on Granovetter’s definition of embeddedness has primarily focused on 
networks, that is, on the structure of the links between actors (Krippner & Alvarez 2007), thus limiting analysis of the 
embedded actors themselves. 
7. This formal bias has focused on decisions and powers specified and restricted by regulations executed by officials 
with expert training in their fields, in which career advancement depends on technical qualifications evaluated by merit-
based organizational rules rather than on the particular individual bureaucrat. 
8. Here Hart touches on neo-patrimonialism without explicitly using the broader language connected with it (see 
Chabal & Daloz 1999; Chabal 2009), focusing upon what they see as the actual politics going on behind the scenes of the 
formal structures – the use of disorder as an instrument of governing (see also Kelsall 2002). 
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9. Nystrand is drawing on Andrew Sayer´s (2000) concept of ‘lay normativity’. 
10. Interestingly, a pairing that mirrors the mutual embeddedness of the state and market in practice. 
11. This violent attempt at creating a New Man and Society was one of the main reasons the Renamo revolt won a 
sustained foothold from the end of the 1970s. 
12. When the 2019 flooding happened with the Idai cyclone, this trusted group of cadres had nearly all been pensioned 
off or had lost their positions due to the new politics of natural gas (see Macuane et al. 2018). 
13. The notion of progress is most explicitly proposed in Fujiyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis, but it often tacitly 
underpins conventional political sociology and new institutional economics approaches built on the open and closed 
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